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NOTES 
 
Surviving an Immigration Marriage 
Fraud Investigation 
ALL YOU NEED IS LOVE, LUCK, AND TIGHT 
PRIVACY CONTROLS 
INTRODUCTION 
Married couples anxiously awaiting interviews with an 
immigration officer are assured “all you need is love.”1 They are 
told not to worry—a fraud interview should not cause concern if 
their marriage is bona fide.2 But any couple that has blindly 
walked into an interview that will determine the validity of its 
marriage soon discovers the stakes are too high to heed such 
flippant advice. It is becoming clearer that what couples really 
need is not love, but luck—and a traditionally palatable marriage. 
Consider the story of Saïd and Patricia.3 After fourteen 
years together, two children, and a dog, they made the mistake 
of assuming that the legitimacy of their marriage would be as 
obvious to an immigration official as it was to them; they did 
not see the need to hire an attorney. Patricia, a U.S. citizen, 
sponsored Saïd’s petition for citizenship. Some months later, 
much to the couple’s dismay, they received a letter from the 
federal government that expressed its dissatisfaction with the 
petition and its need for further information. The distressed 
couple was subsequently scheduled for an investigatory 
interview into their marriage. They presumed this initial 
setback could be attributed to clerical error and once they could 
  
 1 Nina Bernstein, Do You Take This Immigrant?, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010, 
at MB1. 
 2 Id. 
 3 This narrative is illustrative of the spousal-petitioning process conducted 
without the aid of an attorney. The names and any resemblance to actual persons, 
living or dead, events, or places are purely coincidental.  
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present their case in person, all would be resolved. Instead, the 
interview was a “Kafkaesque version of ‘The Newlywed Game’” 
with none of the flashy prizes, but all the risks for marital 
discord.4 Indeed, due to discrepancies in their answers to 
questions such as the color of Patricia’s toothbrush or the 
amount paid on their last electricity bill, they failed their fraud 
interview5 and their petition was denied. The gravity of their 
ill-placed faith in the system was soon realized—Saïd was put 
in removal proceedings. 
Ironically, couples like Patricia and Saïd—stalwart 
believers in the strength of their union—suffer the consequences 
of their convictions while those couples that have something to 
hide realize the necessity6 of retaining an immigration attorney. 
An attorney would have coached them on the specific documents 
to bring to their fraud interview and the questions to expect, 
ranging from the absurd to the invasive.7 Furthermore, an 
attorney would have conducted mock interviews, questioning the 
couple separately, as is often done in marriage fraud interviews 
to assure their answers match.8 Yet even a seasoned 
immigration attorney may not be able to prepare the couple for 
the newest line of questioning by the United States Citizenship 
and Immigration Services (USCIS): “Why aren’t you listed as ‘In 
a relationship’ on Facebook?” 
  
 4 Bernstein, supra note 1, at MB1. The Newlywed Game is an American 
game show premised on determining how well newlyweds know each other. The 
Newlywed Game, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Newlywed_Game (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2011). The competition pits recently married couples against each 
other for the highest number of matching answers to rounds of personal questions 
about their respective spouses. Id. According to some accounts, the show led to many 
marital arguments and even divorce. Id. 
 5 Fraud interview procedures, including the number of rounds conducted, vary 
across states. See generally Chapter 15 Interviewing, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, 
http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-2449.html (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2011).  
 6 Jean Pierre Espinoza, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Removal 
Proceedings Matter of Compean and the Fundamental Fairness Doctrine, 22 FLA. J. INT’L 
L. 65, 66 (2010) (“The complexity of immigration law and the deportation process 
emphasizes the need for counsel . . . .”). Aliens have the right to counsel, but not at the 
expense of the government. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006); see also Donald Kerwin, Revisiting the 
Need for Appointed Counsel, INSIGHT, Apr. 2005, at 1, 16-17, available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/insight/Insight_Kerwin.pdf (concluding that an appointed-
counsel system would better serve government interests).  
 7 Immigration lawyers present at fraud interviews have reported questions 
that address subject matter ranging from the last movie the couple saw together to the 
last time they had sex. See Nina Bernstein, Could Your Marriage Pass the Test?, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 11, 2010, 8:45 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/marriage-
test/?ref=nyregion; Bernstein, supra note 1, at MB1. 
 8 See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 1, at MB1.  
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The U.S. government is establishing a growing presence 
on social networking sites,9 both through stated public policy 
and internal law enforcement strategy.10 Stories of law 
enforcement officials tracking down wanted criminals through 
the use of clues left on social networking sites have been well 
documented by the news media.11 Recently, however, USCIS 
documents released in a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
request reveal a much more disturbing reality—the United 
States government is operating under a presumption of fraud, 
trolling social networking sites on its own initiative without 
first having reason to suspect a couple of deception.12  
The intrusive nature of the inquiry into the marital 
relationship exposes couples whose relationships fall outside of 
the societal norm to what is, at best, an invasion of privacy, 
and, at worst, an erosion of liberty. Part I of this note argues 
that the congressional call for stricter policies in the marital 
immigration context was a result of exaggerated estimates of 
marriage fraud and represented a departure from longstanding 
policies favoring familial reunification. This divergence 
produced a piece of legislation, the Immigration Marriage 
Fraud Amendments of 1986, which unnecessarily burdened 
newlywed couples with bureaucratic hurdles. Part II assesses 
the interplay between family law and immigration law, 
emphasizing the latitude accorded Congress in the latter 
context at the expense of the autonomy normally granted the 
former. Part III traces the history of the legal definition of 
“family,” and its influence on immigration regulation. The 
legally preferred formulation of the nuclear family is then 
contrasted with current demographics to illustrate the 
normative implications resulting from this incongruence.  
  
 9 For the purposes of this note, “social networking sites” and “social media” 
will both refer to current top-trafficked “sharing” sites: Facebook, Twitter, and Flickr. 
See infra note 123 and accompanying text.  
 10 See Memorandum from U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. on Social 
Networking Sites (May 2008) (released to Electronic Frontier Foundation in FOIA 
request) [hereinafter Memorandum]. 
 11 See Julie Masis, Is This Lawman Your Facebook Friend?, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 
11, 2009), http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2009/01/11/is_this_lawman_your_ 
facebook_friend/?page=1; Colin Moynihan, Arrest Puts Focus on Protesters’ Texting, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2009, at A19; Gene Johnson, Fraud Fugitive Busted After Unwise Friend 
Request, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 13, 2009, 2:46 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ 
html/localnews/2010056979_webfacebook13m.html; Editorial, Twitter Tapping, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 13, 2009, at WK8. 
 12 Jennifer Lynch, Applying for Citizenship? U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Wants to Be Your “Friend”, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 12, 
2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/10/applying-citizenship-u-s-citizenship-and. 
712 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:2 
This note will further explore how the implementation 
of the federal government’s policies against U.S. citizen–
spouses of immigrant-hopefuls compromises privacy rights 
while imposing unrealistic and outdated notions of the 
traditional American family. Part IV highlights the new brand 
of investigatory methods the government is using to ferret out 
“sham” marriages, specifically through social media. This 
section exposes the ease with which government actors can 
access personal information by way of deception, but also as a 
fault of the design of the social networking system. Part V 
considers and evaluates the ways in which these practices may 
compromise the constitutionally guaranteed privacy rights of 
American citizen spouses. Part VI draws parallels to emerging 
technologies and identifies the consequent privacy concerns 
that continue to reshape and redefine the scope of Fourth 
Amendment protection. Finally, the shortcomings of the 
current system of evaluating and detecting sham marriages are 
reviewed. Additionally, the conclusion suggests ways in which 
procedures could be improved in order to preserve citizen 
spouses’ constitutional rights to privacy while increasing 
government transparency.  
I. THE ENACTMENT OF THE IMMIGRATION MARRIAGE 
FRAUD AMENDMENTS OF 1986 
United States immigration policy has long touted the 
importance of familial, and especially spousal, reunification.13 To 
wit, “immediate relatives” of United States citizens are granted a 
categorical exemption from numerical limitations on entry.14 
Immediate relatives are statutorily defined as the children, 
spouses, and parents of United States citizens.15 Yet at some point 
in the development of federal immigration policy, the laudable 
goal of family reunification was abandoned in the effort to combat 
the perceived growing threat of fraudulent entry through 
marriage.16 This shift in policy and attitude was most readily 
  
 13 See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 
91 MINN. L. REV. 1625, 1638 (2007) (“Immigration law uses marriage as a category for 
assigning immigration status and does this as part of an explicit policy goal of family 
unification.”). 
 14 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006). 
 15 Id. 
 16 The report reads, 
Historically, U.S. immigration policy has recognized the importance of 
protecting nuclear families from separation by permitting immediate family 
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reflected by the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud 
Amendments of 1986 (IMFA or Amendments),17 a successor to the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952.18 
A. Marriage Fraud Is Everywhere, Yet Nowhere to Be 
Found: An Irrational Fear of Sham Marriages 
Under the heading “Need for Legislation,” a House 
Report on the IMFA reported that “[s]urveys conducted by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service have revealed that 
approximately thirty percent of all petitions for immigrant 
visas involve suspect marital relationships.”19 Presented with 
these worrying figures, it is no wonder Congress called for 
measures to curb the “significant problem in the 
administration of the immigration laws.”20 Since the passage of 
the IMFA, however, that figure has been generally regarded as 
a gross exaggeration.21  
Congress reasoned that fraudulent schemes to obtain 
immigration benefits were more likely to occur in marriages 
celebrated shortly before immigration.22 Thus, as an added 
precaution, the Amendments impose a two-year conditional-
status waiting period on alien spouses of U.S. citizens and 
permanent residents before they are able to petition for 
permanent residency.23 The applicable section defines “alien 
spouses” eligible for permanent status, yet subject to 
conditional status, as those who were “lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence, by virtue of a marriage which was 
  
members of U.S. citizens to immigrate to the United States without numerical 
limitation. . . . Because of this special status . . . [aliens] frequently find it 
expedient to engage in a fraudulent marriage in order to side step the 
immigration law. 
H.R. REP. NO. 99-906 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5978, 5978.  
 17 Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 
100 Stat. 3537 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see also AUSTIN 
T. FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., IMMGR. L. & BUS. § 3:22 (2010). 
 18  Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006)). 
 19 H.R. REP. NO. 99-906 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5978, 5978. 
 20 Id. at 5980 (statement of Hon. Peter W. Rodino, Jr.). 
 21 James A. Jones, The Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments: Sham 
Marriages or Sham Legislation?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 679, 699 (1997) (“[T]he thirty-
percent figure was only based upon the number of cases that field investigators in 
[three] cities suspected were fraudulent; they were not cases where actual fraud has 
been proven. In fact, the INS had never determined the exact number of cases of 
known fraud before Congress enacted the IMFA.”). 
 22 Abrams, supra note 13, at 1683. 
 23 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1); see also FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., supra note 17. 
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entered into less than 24 months before the date the alien 
obtains such status by virtue of such marriage.”24 The alien 
spouse can subsequently remove the conditional limitations on 
residence by jointly filing a second petition (Form I-751) 
starting ninety days prior to the second anniversary of the 
grant of conditional residence status.25 Failure to timely file can 
result in an automatic termination of the conditional status, as 
well as the initiation of deportation proceedings.26  
B. Sanctions on Marriage for an “Improper Purpose” 
Supplemental to the petition, the couple must also 
provide documentation proving that the marriage was not 
entered into for the improper purpose of evading U.S. 
immigration law.27 Termination of the alien spouse’s conditional 
residence status by the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) can occur at any time during the two-year conditional 
period provided that the “qualifying marriage” had as its 
purpose the procurement of an alien’s admission as an 
immigrant.28 Conditional residence status can also be removed 
if the marriage had been judicially annulled or terminated—
other than through the death of a spouse29—or if a fee or other 
  
 24 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(g)(1)(C). 
 25 Id. § 1186a(d)(2)(A); FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., supra note 17. 
 26 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(2)(A). Regulations require that the USCIS notify alien 
spouses of the filing of the second petition when they first acquire conditional resident 
status and at the beginning of the ninety day period in which to file. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 216.2(a)-(b) (2010). However, the next section within the provision specifically places 
the responsibility of filing with the alien and petitioning spouse and does not relieve 
them of the burden of filing should the USCIS fail to provide one, or even both, of the 
notifications. Id. § 216.2(c). Therefore, the alien and petitioning spouse would not fulfill 
their burden of showing “good cause” for failing to jointly file Form I-751 within the 
required time period due to lack of notice by the USCIS. Id.; see also FRAGOMEN, JR. ET 
AL., supra note 17.  
 27 For the purpose of offering proof that a marriage was not entered into to 
defraud the United States government, the USCIS asks for paperwork it views as being 
indicative of the bona fides of a marriage. 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(a)(5). 
Documentation [can include] showing joint ownership of property; Lease 
showing joint tenancy of a common residence; Documentation showing 
commingling of financial resources; Birth certificates of children born to the 
marriage; Affidavits of third parties having knowledge of the bona fides of the 
marital relationship, or Other documentation establishing that the marriage 
was not entered into in order to evade the immigration laws of the United 
States. 
Id. 
 28 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1)(A)(i). 
 29 Id. § 1186a(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
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consideration were given.30 The most obvious punishment for 
evading U.S. immigration laws through marriage fraud is 
deportation of the alien spouse.31 But the increased 
criminalization of immigration-related activities32—in conjunction 
with the increased bureaucratic regulation of immigration 
benefits—places both parties at risk of criminal sanctions, which 
can include terms of imprisonment, fines, and forfeiture of 
property.33 In practice, however, criminal law has been 
disproportionately used against aliens instead of citizens and 
permanent residents.34 Nonetheless, attempting to structure 
federal criminal sanctions around a concept as amorphous as the 
American marriage is futile and inefficient.35 That same argument 
can theoretically apply to all federal immigration regulations that 
rest on notions of a traditional American marriage—especially 
when, as the following sections explore, reality is incongruous 
with the norms Congress imposes. 
II. TESTING CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION OF MARRIAGE AT 
THE INTERSECTION OF FAMILY LAW 
While not considered a branch of family law, 
immigration law heavily influences familial relationships 
through its regulations.36 Additionally, while marriage and 
family law have traditionally been matters reserved to the 
states, the federal government ultimately determines what 
constitutes a valid marriage “for immigration purposes.”37 
Congressional action and Supreme Court jurisprudence have 
shaped the immigrant relationship in ways that not only 
diverge from current cultural norms, but also fail to align with 
  
 30 Id. § 1186a(b)(1)(B). 
 31 Id. § 1227(a)(1)(G). 
 32 See generally Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration 
Law: Employer Sanctions and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669 (1997) 
(arguing that “criminal sanctions are inappropriate as a method of deterring United 
States citizens or permanent residents” from using marriage as a means to evade 
immigration laws).  
 33 Id. at 676. 
 34 Id. at 674. 
 35 Id. at 699-700 (“But the nature of the marriage relationship between two 
consenting adults is too private, too elusive, and too subjective to be defined in the 
public sphere in a way that obligates the parties to meet certain public expectations 
defined not by moral, social or religious communities but by a political community—the 
sovereign, and to act in particular ways under threat of criminal sanctions.”). 
 36 Abrams, supra note 13, at 1629. 
 37 Id. at 1670 (“Immigration law has its own prerequisites for who may enter 
a valid marriage, which in some ways track state law and in others supersede it.”). 
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state policies.38 The IMFA is but one example of the federal 
government’s prominence in defining marriage in the 
immigration setting. Judicial tests developed over the years to 
parse the bona fides of a marriage often pit family and 
immigration law against each other; courts are reluctant to 
allow governmental intrusion into the familial sphere yet are 
permissive of governmental regulation of immigration matters.39 
Thus, a brief overview of the treatment of marriage in the 
immigration context is necessary to understand the complex 
dynamic40 that exists between immigration and family law.  
A. Congressional Power as Primary 
Matters of naturalization are generally regarded to be 
legislative functions41 superseding the role of the judiciary.42 
Indeed, Congress’s plenary power over immigration is so 
sweeping that the Supreme Court has upheld numerous 
restrictions of aliens’ “rights” that would be untenable if applied 
to American citizens.43 In the name of immigration regulation, 
Congress can pass laws that are overtly discriminatory toward 
nonresident aliens without fear of a successful constitutional 
challenge—aliens are not a “protected class,” so they are not 
entitled to the same constitutional guarantees as American 
  
 38 See, e.g., id. at 1634 (“In contrast to state family law, the federal 
immigration system passes judgment on and influences decision making in marriages 
involving immigrants throughout the four stages of marriage: courtship, entry, intact 
marriage, and exit.”). 
 39 Jennifer M. Chacón, Loving Across Borders: Immigration Law and the 
Limits of Loving, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 345, 348-49; see also Abrams, supra note 13, at 
1633 (“[Family] law not only suspects that intervention will do harm; it doubts that 
intervention will do good . . . .”). 
 40 Abrams, supra note 13, at 1646 (“Immigration law thus places Congress 
and those it regulates in an unusual position. Congress has atypically broad power to 
regulate in the immigration arena, and even if that regulation happens to regulate 
marriage, the usual prohibition against congressional involvement in family law does 
not apply. At the same time, family law . . . is one area that is clearly beyond any of 
Congress’s enumerated powers . . . .”). 
 41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (giving Congress the power to set uniform 
naturalization rules). 
 42 Rachel Blitzer, Comment, The Kiss of Death for “Living in Marital Union”: 
Strict Judicial Scrutiny of Department of Homeland Security Marital Fraud 
Procedures, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 495, 496. 
 43 Abrams, supra note 13, at 1640 (asserting that the plenary power doctrine 
gives Congress almost complete power to regulate immigration as it sees fit, even if it 
would constitute an abridgement of rights in a nonimmigration context); Marcel De 
Armas, Comment, For Richer or Poorer or Any Other Reason: Adjudicating Immigration 
Marriage Fraud Cases Within the Scope of the Constitution, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 743, 747 (2007) (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976)). 
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citizens.44 Courts have declined to apply strict scrutiny to review 
DHS regulations, instead favoring a semblance of rational basis 
review, regardless of the degree to which these regulations 
infringe on the right to marry.45  
However, this deference is arguably misplaced, and the 
Supreme Court should not be deterred by Congress’s plenary 
power when adjudicating a matter as fundamental as the right to 
marry.46 Furthermore, the federal government’s treatment of 
potential immigrants is becoming increasingly difficult to accept 
in light of the inevitable effects on Americans whose alien 
spouses’ rights are abridged. Admittedly Congress has a 
legitimate concern and a special interest in regulating family-
based immigration due to the aforementioned benefits immediate 
relative status provides. But considering that the actual 
petitioner in most cases is the American citizen spouse,47 it is 
worthwhile to note the discrepancies in treatment. One is often 
left to wonder whether citizens sacrifice their own constitutional 
guarantees in the effort to gain the same for their alien spouses, 
and whether this may be considered an even exchange.48 
B. Legislative and Judicial Interplay 
Recognizing that government intrusion in the marriage 
relationship is socially unwelcome and historically disfavored,49 a 
quick study of the manner in which courts have interpreted and 
applied congressional legislation evidences the extent of judicial 
deference in matters concerning immigration regulation. A 
review of seminal decisions in this area illustrates the distance 
between the exercise of immigration law in the marital sphere 
and classic family law jurisprudence.50 Still, as the subsequent 
  
 44 Abrams, supra note 13, at 1641-42. 
 45 For a more in-depth discussion of the standards of review applied in 
naturalization cases, see Part III.C of Blitzer, supra note 42, at 511-16. See generally 
Jesse I. Santana, The Proverbial Catch-22: The Unconstitutionality of Section Five of 
the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, 25 CAL. W. L. REV 1 (1988). 
 46 Blitzer, supra note 42, at 510-11 (arguing for a standard of strict scrutiny 
in challenges to DHS regulations of marriage). 
 47 In some instances, such as with the Battered Spouse Waiver, the alien spouse 
may petition for herself. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(C) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(a)(iii) (2010). 
 48 See David Moyce, Comment, Petitioning on Behalf of an Alien Spouse: Due 
Process Under the Immigration Laws, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1747, 1761 (1986) (arguing that 
even a constitutional challenge from a U.S. citizen is an “uphill battle because the 
Court has virtually abdicated its role of judicial review in immigration cases”). 
 49 See generally Kris Franklin, Note, A Family Like Any Other Family: 
Alternative Methods of Defining Family Law, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1027 
(1991); Moyce, supra note 48, at 1776. 
 50 See infra Parts II.B.1-3. 
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sections indicate, an important role for the judiciary exists to 
guide the interactions between immigration and family law and 
to effect substantive and procedural change. 
1. A Primer: The War Brides Act of 1945 and Lutwak v. 
United States 
Laying the foundation for future evaluative tests and 
the IMFA generally, the Supreme Court tackled the issue of 
“good faith” marriages in the 1953 case of Lutwak v. United 
States.51 Lutwak concerned the now-defunct War Brides Act of 
1945, which provided for expedited entry for alien spouses of 
American war veterans.52 In the case, three World War II 
veterans returned home to the United States after making a 
detour through Paris to marry.53 Their French spouses were 
legally admitted into the country as beneficiaries of the War 
Brides Act.54 In each instance, there was evidence that the 
couples either never lived together as husband and wife, or 
separated within a few months.55 The Court also noted that one 
of the marriages “was never consummated and was never 
intended to be.”56 The petitioners contended that their 
intentions for getting married were irrelevant and that the 
performance of the marriage ceremonies was in and of itself 
sufficient proof of the validity of the marriages.57 The Supreme 
Court declined to follow this logic: “The common understanding 
of a marriage, which Congress must have had in mind when it 
made provision for ‘alien spouses’ in the War Brides Act, is that 
the two parties have undertaken to establish a life together 
and assume certain duties and obligations. Such was not the 
case here . . . .”58 While this issue was not part of the direct 
holding of the case on appeal, the Court’s comments provided 
the framework for future determinations of a valid marriage.59 
  
 51 Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953).  
 52 War Brides Act, ch. 591, 59 Stat. 659 (1945) (expired Dec. 28, 1948).  
 53 Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 608-09. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 609. 
 57 Id. at 610. (There was no dispute at trial as to whether the couples had 
conducted formal marriage ceremonies.) 
 58 Id. at 611. 
 59 See De Armas, supra note 43, at 749-50.  
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2. Pre-IMFA Substantive and Procedural Guidelines 
Historically, one standard for detecting and evaluating 
marriage fraud was “viability,” whereby a couple could be 
denied immigration benefits if they separated, or if the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now the 
USCIS,60 otherwise discovered that the “marriage was not 
viable and subsisting at the time the benefit was sought.”61 The 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals questioned the value of the 
viability requirement as a guideline in detecting sham 
marriages, and instead refocused the adjudicator’s evaluation 
of the union on the parties’ intentions at the time they 
married.62 A seminal case in that line of decisions, Bark v. INS, 
interpreted “intent” as the intent to “establish a life together.”63 
The court elaborated, “Conduct of the parties after marriage is 
relevant only to the extent that it bears upon their subjective 
state of mind at the time they were married.”64 The IMFA 
subsequently amended the inquiry into sham marriages, 
though some suggest that the two tests are not one in the 
same—a couple could fail the Bark test but pass the IMFA.65 
Nevertheless, the Amendments did not obsolete the Bark 
standard entirely; the IMFA solicits evidence that corresponds 
to both authorities.66 
Very soon after Bark, a Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
case, Stokes v. INS,67 also established certain guidelines for 
  
 60 The USCIS officially assumed responsibility for immigration service 
functions of the federal government on March 1, 2003, as a result of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 451, 116 Stat. 2135, 2195. The Act 
dismantled the INS into three components, which were subsumed by the DHS. Our 
History, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/ 
menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=e00c0b89284a3210VgnVC
M100000b92ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=e00c0b89284a3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60a
RCRD (last visited Dec. 29, 2010); see also David A. Martin, Immigration Policy and 
the Homeland Security Act Reorganization: An Early Agenda for Practical 
Improvements, 80 INTERPRETER RELEASES 601, 601 (Apr. 28, 2003). 
 61 FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., supra note 17, § 3:21. 
 62 Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 1975) (citing Lutwak, 344 U.S. 
604); Whetstone v. INS, 561 F.2d 1303, 1306 (9th Cir. 1977) (no requirement of duration).  
 63 Bark, 511 F.2d at 1201 (“Petitioner’s marriage was a sham if the bride and 
groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married.”); see 
also FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., supra note 17, § 3:20; Abrams, supra note 13, at 1682. 
 64 Bark, 511 F.2d at 1202. 
 65 Abrams, supra note 13, at 1685 (“Notice that [the Bark] standard is 
different from the IMFA standard: a couple could fail the Bark test (because the 
spouses did not ‘intend to establish a life together’) yet pass the IMFA test because 
they did not enter into marriage ‘for the purpose of evading the immigration laws.’”). 
 66 Petitioners are encouraged to provide documentation showing proof of 
cohabitation, reproduction, and commingling of finances. Abrams, supra note 13, at 1683.  
 67 Stokes v. INS, No. 74 Civ. 1022 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1976) (consent judgment).  
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adjudicating suspect I-130 spousal petitions.68 While the former 
case was significant for its substantive implications,69 the latter 
was hailed as a procedural milestone in this area of law.70 As a 
result of this New York case, the “Stokes Unit” was formed as a 
division of the USCIS, unique to the New York District Office.71 
Petitioners are referred to the Stokes Unit if they fail their first 
fraud interview or if they are currently in removal 
proceedings.72 The Unit’s enumerated procedures include a 
written notice detailing the petitioner’s rights, a list of rights 
mailed as a separate attachment to the appointment letter, and 
a list of requested documents to be submitted at the interview 
appointment.73 Officers also record the interviews as an added 
procedural safeguard74 and are not to inquire into the sexual 
practices or contraceptive use of the petitioning couple.75 Unlike 
other parts of the country where authorities may stage dawn 
  
 68 See Note, The Constitutionality of the INS Sham Marriage Investigation 
Policy, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1238, 1252 (1986) [hereinafter Sham Marriage]; Moyce, supra 
note 48, at 1757 n.74. 
 69 See Abrams, supra note 13, at 1685. 
 70 The USCIS’s practice manual for adjudicators contains a separate section on 
“Stokes” interviews, deeming them “of interest” to adjudicators throughout the Service as an 
exemplar of an effective fraud interview program. 15.5 New York City District Office 
(“Stokes”) Interviews, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/ 
ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-2449/0-0-0-2716.html (last visited Sept. 30, 
2011); see also Jan H. Brown, Family Immigration Issues—Love Conquers All?, 1514 
PRACTISING LAW INST.: CORP. LAW & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 247, 256 (2005) (“In 
the second circuit, if an interviewer is not satisfied with the bona fides of a marriage, the 
case is referred for a secondary interview . . . . In the other circuits, the parties are not 
protected by [the Stokes] decision and interviewers can separate the parties at the 
initial (and often only) interview, an understanding in the quest for bona fides of the 
marriage.”). 
 71 15.5 New York City District Office (“Stokes”) Interviews, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-
2449.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2011); Moyce, supra note 48, at 1757 n.74; see also 
Brown, supra note 70, at 256.  
 72 See Brown, supra note 70, at 256; 15.5 New York City District Office (“Stokes”) 
Interviews, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/ 
HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-2449.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2011) (“The unit receives the 
bulk of its work from the regular adjustment of status unit (75%) with the remainder of 
cases referred from the Litigation Unit. . . . Without such a remand the Stokes Unit 
adjudicates only the I-130 petition.”). 
 73 15.5 New York City District Office (“Stokes”) Interviews, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGR. SERVICES, available at http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-
1/0-0-0-2449.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). 
 74 See Nina Bernstein, Wed in 1993, but Stuck in Immigration Limbo, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 13, 2010, at A16. 
 75 Bernstein, supra note 1, at MB1; see also Moyce, supra note 48, at 1757 
n.74 (discussing procedural standards resulting from the Stokes consent judgment, 
including the proscription against sexually intimate questions, and the prohibition 
against petition denial solely based on a petitioner’s exercise of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination). 
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“bed checks,” New York forbids the practice.76 This difference is 
significant; as one Denver-based immigration attorney recounted 
to the New York Times, “Someone shows up at your house with a 
badge and a gun, unannounced . . . . ‘Hi, we’re here from 
immigration. Do you mind if we come in to look and see if two 
towels are wet?’”77 Comparatively, Stokes seemed a landmark win 
for marital privacy in immigrant homes. But the case’s effect has 
been more theoretical than practical. More than three decades 
since the decisions in Bark and Stokes, and over two decades since 
the promulgation of the IMFA, the federal government still 
refuses to respect the guidelines that do exist and is reluctant to 
acknowledge the need for modern normative standards.78 
3. Balancing Theory Against Practice 
Regardless of Bark’s interpretation of “intent,” Lutwak’s 
focus on the petitioning couple at the time they were married, 
and Stokes’s concerns with procedural safeguards, 
administrators’ decisions are largely discretionary and rarely 
questioned.79 Great importance is still given to behavior that 
takes place after the marriage ceremony.80 Moreover, officers 
have been known to violate protocol in a variety of ways, 
including asking about interviewees’ sexual lives and 
contraceptive use.81 Thus, even though practice manuals 
directed at adjudicators exist,82 it is still unclear exactly what 
  
 76 Bernstein, supra note 1, at MB1.  
 77 Id. (quoting Laura Lichter, Esq.). 
 78 See infra Part III. 
 79 See Moyce, supra note 48, at 1752 (claiming that adjudicators “operate 
with a relatively free hand”). 
 80 One justification is that these behaviors shed light on the intentions of the 
couple at the time they were married. Abrams, supra note 13, at 1685. 
Cohabitation, commingling of finances, and reproduction are the three primary 
ways of proving the bona fides of a marriage. All three of these factors, though, 
involve events that happen after the marriage takes place, and courts use these 
events to try to determine what the couple intended at the moment of 
marrying. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 81 See Bernstein, supra note 7; Moyce, supra note 48, at 1757 n.74 (“There is 
evidence, however, that those standards that have been established are frequently 
ignored by the officials who actually pass upon the petitions.”); see also Sham 
Marriage, supra note 68, at 1243. 
 82 See generally Adjudicator’s Field Manual—Redacted Public Version, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.f6da 
51a2342135be7e9d7a10e0dc91a0/?vgnextoid=fa7e539dc4bed010VgnVCM1000000ecd19
0aRCRD&vgnextchannel=fa7e539dc4bed010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&CH=afm 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2011). 
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the DHS and USCIS are looking for—beyond documentation—
in order to make their determinations. Couples could be 
happily married for years and still fail to present a satisfactory 
marriage for the purposes of the USCIS.83  
Consider the plight of one couple chronicled in the New 
York Times, the citizen spouse joking, “our marriage certificate is 
so old, it’s yellow.”84 If the consequences were not so grave, their 
story would be comical. The New York couple has been married 
seventeen years; yet after three petitions and five marriage 
interviews, federal immigration officials were still not satisfied 
that the couple’s union was not a ruse to obtain status.85 The 
couple even presented authorities with documentation normally 
indicative of the bona fides of a marriage,86 such as a joint 
apartment lease, tax filings, bank statements, and photo albums.87 
According to the article, conflicting answers they gave four years 
prior—to questions such as whether the husband had taken his 
wife out to eat on her last birthday—overshadowed the probative 
value of their documentation.88 Their last denial letter also 
attacked the insufficiency of funds in their joint bank account.89 
Interestingly, for all the procedural benefits the Stokes Unit 
purportedly offers over other states, the couple lamented that 
they would have preferred a home visit.90 Any attempt to reconcile 
their experience with present attitudes toward the nebulous 
nature of relationships today must remember to take into account 
the qualities an adjudicator will be looking for—characteristics of 
a prototypical marriage.91 As the next part argues, Congress is 
  
 83 Bernstein, supra note 74, at A16.  
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. (quoting the petitioner, “If I was, in fact, fraudulently married to my 
husband for the purposes of obtaining a green card for him, would I have continued to 
file over and over and over again?”). 
 86 See supra text accompanying note 27. 
 87 Bernstein, supra note 74, at A16. 
 88 Id. 
 89 In its last denial letter, the immigration agency dismissed documents 
normally indicative of the bona fides of marriage, noting, for example, 
that the joint account they opened in 1997 showed low balances of $8.11 and 
$62.15 in two 2008 statements. The letter concluded that their documents did 
not outweigh the discrepancies in answers the couple gave at their 2006 
interview—like her statement that their rent was $677.17, while he said, 
“About $700.” 
Id. 
 90 Id. (“The couple say they wish that federal officials would just go up to 
their fifth-floor apartment to see how they manage on her Supplemental Security 
Income disability payments and his meager wages.”). 
 91 See infra Part III.  
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effectively holding cross-cultural couples to an antiquated 
standard that even most Americans today would not meet. 
III. DEFINING “FAMILY” IN UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION 
POLICY: AN AMERICAN ANACHRONISM 
While congressional attitude toward the convention of 
marriage is out of line with prevailing cultural norms, it is not 
an anomaly—the notion of “family” preferred and recognized by 
American law is rooted in centuries-old history and values.92 
The passage of time has not much altered this concept, an 
embodiment of the traditional patriarchal household.93 This 
stagnation in American jurisprudence has effectively 
“enshrined the mythological nuclear family as its ideal model.”94 
As a result, current laws favor an ideal that amounts to a 
fallacy in the majority of American households.95 The law’s 
insistence on adhering to a family archetype based on 
antiquated norms severely prejudices and disadvantages all 
who fall outside of the traditional structure.96 
A. Evolving Society, Antiquated Definitions 
Nowhere is the impracticality of this preference for a 
conventional standard more obvious than in the immigration 
context; requiring international couples to conform to the mold 
of an old-fashioned American marriage is illogical since, by 
definition, international marriages “blend two cultures, at least 
one of which is not American.”97 Moreover, the definition of 
what constitutes a traditional American marriage has changed 
and expanded.98 Due to rising rates of divorce, single parenting, 
step-parenting, polyparenting, and unmarried cohabitation, 
only a minority of families today fit the nuclear model.99 
  
 92 Jennifer R. Johnson, Preferred by Law: The Disappearance of the Traditional 
Family and Law’s Refusal to Let It Go, 25 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 125, 125 (2004). 
 93 Id. at 126. 
 94 Franklin, supra note 49, at 1052. 
 95 See generally Johnson, supra note 92. 
 96 Id. at 125. 
 97 Blitzer, supra note 42, at 498. 
 98 See Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional 
Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1640 (1991) 
[hereinafter Family Resemblance].  
 99 See Johnson, supra note 92, at 128-29 (“[A]s of 2000, [nuclear] families 
comprised just 23.5% of the American population. This statistic means that almost four 
out of five American families do not fit this model.”); see also Family Resemblance, 
supra note 98, at 1640. 
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Further, evidence indicates that alternative familial models are 
on the rise while the conventional archetype continues to 
decline.100 For example, some “traditionally married couples” 
choose not to combine their “legal and financial affairs.”101 
Others, especially elderly couples, may not consummate the 
marriage.102 Thus, it makes little sense to hold anyone to this 
“mythological nuclear model” of two heterosexual adult 
partners who are married with two children, much less a 
multicultural family.103  
Interestingly, it has been suggested that immigration 
policy that attempts to conform marriages to the conventional 
cast may have it backward since immigrants often espouse the 
very ideals considered to be traditional, and do so better than 
American-born citizens.104 Additionally, if anything, “marriages 
of convenience” are an accepted and established institution in 
American culture; it is certainly not novel to hear of someone 
marrying for riches, celebrity, or social status, so why should 
marrying for immigration status be regarded so harshly? And 
yet the validity of American marriages is not questioned, while 
multicultural couples are forced to rebut the presumption of a 
fraudulent marriage.  
B. Practical Consequences of Promoting a Stereotypical 
Marriage 
The judiciary has recognized that it is not appropriate 
for courts to require alien spouses “to have more conventional 
or more successful marriages than citizens.”105 Courts have also 
acknowledged that regulating a couple’s behavior and conduct 
raises constitutional issues.106 Yet, practically speaking, 
  
 100 Johnson, supra note 92, at 129 
 101 Family Resemblance, supra note 98, at 1654.  
 102 See id.  
 103 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 92, at 128 (“Today’s families, whether once-
nuclear Families now divorced or families that never took the traditional form, do not 
in fact follow the model of two Married Parents with dependent children.”). 
 104 David Brooks, Immigrants to Be Proud Of, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2006, at 
A25; Chacón, supra note 39, at 374 (“Ironically, the families of noncitzens may better 
exemplify traditional ‘family values’ than nonimmigrant families. Children in 
immigrant households are more likely to live in two-parent households than children in 
entirely native families.”). 
 105 Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201-02 (1975); Blitzer, supra note 42, at 499. 
 106 Bark, 511 F.2d at 1201 (“Any attempt to regulate their life styles, such as 
prescribing the amount of time they must spend together, or designating the manner in 
which either partner elects to spend his or her time, in the guise of specifying the 
requirements of a bona fide marriage would raise serious constitutional questions.”); 
see also Blitzer, supra note 42, at 499. 
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citizenship hopefuls are being held to a higher standard than 
their citizen counterparts. A USCIS agency worksheet recently 
leaked on the Internet lists “red flags” for officers to check off 
when evaluating I-130 petitions for marriage fraud.107 Suspect 
characteristics include “unusual” or large discrepancies in age, an 
“unusual” number of children or large gaps in age between 
children, “unusual” cultural differences, and “unusual” 
associations between family members.108 As an immigration 
lawyer commented to the New York Times, “[T]he boxes on the 
worksheet ‘pretty much invite racial profiling and other 
stereotypes.’”109 The worksheet fails to define what would 
constitute, for example, an “unusual” cultural difference; at least, 
not beyond soliciting officers to make personal value judgments 
based on which cultural phenomena qualify as abnormal. Also 
unclear is against whose cultural benchmark petitioners are 
measured—almost 25 percent of married couples accounted for in 
the 2000 census list an age difference of six or more years.110 
When does a May-December pairing cease to be a 
romantic notion and begin to arouse suspicion? The criteria 
listed on the “Fraud Referral Worksheet” may not act as a direct 
mandate for a determination of fraud; however, they do provide 
insight into the highly discretionary, arbitrary, and culturally 
insensitive message the USCIS communicates to its officers. An 
unfortunate consequence of the U.S. government’s approach to 
evaluating the bona fides of a marriage is that petitioners may 
further arouse the suspicions of officers by attempting to conform 
to the ideal of a picture-perfect couple.111 Clearly officers will be 
sensitive to any indications of unnatural behavior in an interview 
setting.112 One author tells the story of an alien spouse who failed 
to state that he was living separately from his wife—presumably 
because he believed this fact would provoke suspicion.113 DHS 
  
 107 Fraud Referral Worksheet, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (Sept. 30, 
2004), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/USCIS_Fraud_ 
Referral_Sheet.pdf. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Bernstein, supra note 1, at MB1 (quoting Daniel Lundy, Esq.). 
 110 Table FG3: Married Couple Family Groups, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 
2001), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2001/tabFG3.pdf. 
 111 Abrams, supra note 13, at 1691 (“One inevitable result of an immigration 
policy that uses marriage as a category for admission is that immigrants are required 
to self-police their marriages, crafting the kind of marriages that they think will pass 
muster in immigration service interviews even where the marriages they had 
anticipated having would have looked much different.”). 
 112 Fraud Referral Worksheet, supra note 107, at 1. 
 113 Abrams, supra note 13, at 1687-92 (recounting anecdotal evidence from 
several couples falsely accused of fraud). 
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subsequently learned the truth, deemed it a material 
misrepresentation, and denied his petition.114  
A section of the Fraud Referral worksheet applicable to 
all evaluations, entitled “General Behavioral Fraud Indicators 
Guide,” identifies specific potentially suspect behaviors such as 
“extreme nervousness” and devotes three of the ten checklist 
boxes to attorney presence in the interview.115 The three boxes 
correspond to any answers that may be prompted or 
interrupted by an attorney, or any attempts by the attorney to 
distract or mislead.116 Two issues immediately become apparent. 
First, it would appear unnatural not to be considerably nervous 
in a setting where the outcome could mean the deportation of 
your spouse. Second, devoting so much attention to attorneys’ 
behavior undermines the principle of attorney presence as a 
procedural safeguard.117 Furthermore, distrust of attorneys is 
unwarranted since it has been suggested that attorneys 
actually aid in the policing of sham marriages by acting as a 
preliminary barrier to vet clients for fraud.118 In any event, the 
question persists: what evidence suffices to show a valid 
marriage? Based on sample USCIS administrative officers’ 
questions, it would seem that knowledge of the intricacies of 
one’s microwave oven is indicative of a bona fide marriage.119 
But if this were sufficient, then why has the USCIS taken to 
social networking sites as a measure to investigate fraud? 
IV. UPGRADING INVESTIGATIVE METHODS, DOWNGRADING 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS 
Facebook,120 Twitter,121 and Flickr122 are social networking 
and media-sharing sites, and they all fall, in that order, within 
  
 114 Id. 
 115 Fraud Referral Worksheet, supra note 107. 
 116 Id. 
 117 See Harvey Kaplan, Stokes Revisited, 9 IMMIGR. J., July-Sept. 1986, at 4. 
 118 Abrams, supra note 13, at 1692. 
 119 Sample questions provided by lawyers present at Stokes interviews 
include: “Is your microwave stationary or does it have a revolving plate? If you are 
standing at and facing your kitchen sink, where is the microwave oven?” Bernstein, 
supra note 7. 
 120 According to the company’s factsheet, “Facebook is a social utility that 
helps people communicate more efficiently with their friends, family and 
coworkers. . . . Anyone can sign up for Facebook and interact with the people they know 
in a trusted environment.” Factsheet, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/ 
info.php?factsheet (last visited Nov. 3, 2011). 
 121 Twitter is a “real-time information network” that is primarily a way of 
sharing 140 character messages called “Tweets.” About, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/ 
about (last visited Nov. 3, 2011). 
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the top twenty-six most visited websites in the United States.123 
Facebook, the second most visited site, has more than 800 
million active users, and the average user has 130 friends and 
is connected to 80 community pages, groups, and events.124 The 
site’s founder, Mark Zuckerberg, envisions a utopian world 
fueled by openness and connectedness—simply put, a world of 
seamless sharing.125 This strong preference for visibility in 
online communications translates to a privacy model that 
defaults to maximum exposure, placing the onus on users to 
scale back access.126 Unfortunately for citizenship petitioners, 
just as social media is a useful and attractive tool for 
individuals looking to network or connect with distant friends, 
family, or even fans, it is also a beacon for anyone looking for a 
centralized database of personal information, including the 
U.S. government. As Internet services that encourage people to 
store an abundance of personal information—including 
photographs, e-mails, and contact lists—rise in popularity, so 
does the temptation for law enforcement to tap into the trove of 
personally identifiable information.127 
A. Placing Social Media on USCIS’ Radar and Agents’ 
Agendas 
The federal government has taken active measures to 
ensure that its agents are aware of the popularity of social 
  
 122 Flickr is an online photo management and sharing application that aims 
“to get photos and video into and out of the system in as many ways as [possible],” 
including on the Flickr website, RSS feeds, e-mail, posts to outside blogs, etc. About 
Flickr, FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2011). 
 123 Top Sites in United States, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries;0/ 
US (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (Facebook #2, Twitter #7, Flickr #26). Globally, Facebook is #2, 
Twitter #9, and Flickr #35. Top 500 Global Sites, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/ 
topsites/global;0 (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). 
 124 Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2011). “Active” users are defined as those who have returned to the site in 
the previous thirty days. Factsheet, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/ 
info.php?factsheet (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).  
 125 Michiko Kakutani, Company on the Verge of a Social Breakthrough, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 8, 2010, at C1 (describing Zuckerberg as “a chief executive with an almost 
missionary zeal when it comes to getting people to share information” in a review of 
David Kirkpatrick’s book, The Facebook Effect).  
 126 Id. 
 127 Apparently law enforcement officials are succumbing to the temptation—
Google counted more than 4200 requests for consumer data by United States law 
enforcement agencies in the first half of 2010 alone. Miguel Helft & Claire Cain Miller, 
Web Outruns Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2011, at A1. Verizon made a similar 
calculation before Congress in 2007, reporting that it received an average of 90,000 
such requests each year. Id. In 2009, Facebook reported that ten to twenty subpoenas 
and other orders were arriving daily. Id.  
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networking sites, as well as the degree to which these sites are 
willing to cooperate with law enforcement.128 In a PowerPoint 
presentation by the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property 
Section (CCIPS) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) on the legal 
and practical implications of obtaining evidence from social 
networking sites, agents are shown the benefits of going 
undercover on these sites—namely, that they will be able to gain 
access to nonpublic information, communicate with suspects and 
targets, and map social relationships.129 In fact, law enforcement 
officials have already had success in criminal investigations with 
the help of Twitter130 and Facebook,131 among others. Naturally, 
the government has a legitimate and vested interest in tracking 
crime suspects; instructing agents to infiltrate the social 
networks of citizenship petitioners, however, presumes guilt and 
fails to confine the inquiry to ongoing criminal investigations.132 
This gray area opens the back door to using social networking 
sites to troll profiles for potential targets.  
A May 2008 memorandum from the Office of Fraud 
Detection and National Security (FDNS) entitled “Social 
Networking Sites and Their Importance to FDNS” elaborates 
on the utility of social media, specifically in immigration 
marriage fraud investigations.133 
Narcissistic tendencies in many people fuels [sic] a need to have a 
large group of “friends” link to their pages and many of these people 
accept cyber-friends that they don’t even know. This provides an 
excellent vantage point for FDNS to observe the daily life of 
beneficiaries and petitioners . . . [and] gives FDNS an opportunity to 
reveal fraud by browsing these sites to see if petitioners and 
beneficiaries are in a valid relationship or are attempting to deceive 
[US]CIS about their relationship.134 
  
 128 JOHN LYNCH & JENNY ELLICKSON, OBTAINING AND USING EVIDENCE FROM 
SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES: FACEBOOK, MYSPACE, LINKEDIN, AND MORE, available at 
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/social_network/20100303__crim_socialnetworking.pdf. 
 129 Id. 
 130 See, e.g., Moynihan, supra note 11, at A19 (man spreading information about 
police movements on Twitter arrested on charges of hindering apprehension or prosecution, 
criminal use of a communication facility, and possession of instruments of a crime). 
 131 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 11. A bank fraud fugitive was captured in 
Cancún after U.S. authorities tracked him down through Facebook. Id. While his 
profile was set to private, his list of friends was not. Id. The Secret Service discovered 
one of his “friends” had an affiliation with the Justice Department and used this 
connection to access information about the fugitive’s whereabouts. Id.; see also Masis, 
supra note 11. 
 132 See supra text accompanying note 127. 
 133 See Memorandum, supra note 10. 
 134 Id. 
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It is clear from this memorandum that the USCIS, in 
recognition of the false sense of security fostered on social 
networking sites, is recommending its agents befriend 
citizenship petitioners in order to view information to which 
they would not otherwise have access. As the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (EFF) highlighted, the memo does not 
specify any threshold of suspicion that must be triggered before 
the agency deploys these covert tactics.135 The lack of guidance 
or boundaries effectively gives DHS agents the message that 
any petitioner is an acceptable target for monitoring in this 
fashion. Additionally, the memo fails to address whether DHS 
agents are obligated to reveal their government affiliation, an 
omission that seems to openly encourage deception. If a user 
unknowingly accepts a friend request from an agent using an 
alias, the user may not only expose himself to DHS monitoring, 
but also all of his contacts.136 While petitioners and beneficiaries 
may have the wisdom to reject or ignore friend requests from 
perfect strangers, they cannot prevent their contacts from 
falling into a trap.  
And yet, the underhandedness of DHS operations is not 
the most frightening part of the released FDNS memo; it 
dangerously assumes that individuals speak truthfully when 
posting on social networking sites.137 The federal memorandum 
parallels patrolling social networking sites to making an 
“unannounced cyber ‘site-visit’ on a [sic] petitioners and 
beneficiaries.”138 Again, this analogy incorrectly assumes that 
people behave in the same way, or put forth the same 
impressions, online as they do in everyday life. The federal 
government, as a result of this faulty logic, is not accounting for 
any discrepancies that may exist between the two when 
instructing its agents to browse social networking sites to 
investigate petitioners’ and beneficiaries’ purported 
relationships.139 Consequently, as EFF warns, “this memo 
suggests there’s nothing to prevent an exaggerated, harmless or 
even out-of-date off-hand comment in a status update from 
quickly becoming the subject of a full citizenship investigation.”140  
  
 135 Lynch, supra note 12. 
 136 See supra text accompanying note 131. 
 137 Memorandum, supra note 10. 
 138 Id. 
 139 See id.  
 140 Lynch, supra note 12. 
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B. Studies Reveal Availability and Accessibility of Private 
Information on Social Media  
Two recent studies conducted by a security software 
company explore the ease with which individuals in cyberspace 
expose their own personal information, as well as that of their 
contacts.141 The studies illustrate the risks posed to citizenship 
petitioners and beneficiaries in the event federal agents—
especially those using an alias—target their marriage. In the 
first experiment, conducted in 2007, researchers created a 
profile on Facebook for “Freddi Staur,” an anagram of “ID 
Fraudster,” represented by a small green plastic frog.142 In the 
next phase, two hundred random friend requests were sent to 
Facebook users across the globe.143 The aim was to see how 
many people would accept Freddi into their network, thus 
revealing personal information about themselves and exposing 
everyone in their networks to infiltration.144 The results were 
less than comforting: 41 percent of people approached 
responded to the friend request.145 Of these responders, the 
majority leaked personal data, including photos of family and 
friends as well as information about their likes, dislikes, 
hobbies, and employers.146 
Apparently, the situation has not improved with time; 
in fact, a follow-up study two years later suggests that 
Facebook users have become even more cavalier with their 
personal information.147 The 2009 study featured two fabricated 
profiles: “Daisy Felettin” (an anagram of “false identity”), a 
twenty-one-year-old female represented by a picture of a toy 
rubber duck, and, “Dinette Stonily” (an anagram of “stolen 
identity”), a fifty-six-year-old female with a profile picture of 
  
 141 Facebook: The Privacy Challenge, SOPHOS, http://www.sophos.com/en-us/ 
security-news-trends/security-trends/facebook.aspx (last visited Oct. 8, 2011). 
 142 Sophos Facebook ID Probe Shows 41% of Users Happy to Reveal All to 
Potential Identity Thieves, SOPHOS (Aug. 14, 2007), http://www.sophos.com/en-us/press-
office/press-releases/2007/08/facebook.aspx. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. Specifically, 87 of the 200 users contacted responded to Freddi. Id. Of 
those respondents, 72% revealed one or more e-mail addresses, 84% detailed their full 
date of birth, 87% provided details about their education and work experience, 78% 
listed their current address or location, 23% listed their current phone number, and 
26% provided their instant messaging screenname. Id. 
 147 See Facebook Users at Risk of “Rubber Duck” Identity Attack, SOPHOS (Dec. 7, 
2009), http://www.sophos.com/en-us/press-office/press-releases/2009/12/facebook.aspx.  
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two cats lying on a rug.148 Each profile submitted one hundred 
friend requests to randomly chosen users in their age group.149 
Within a mere two weeks, Daisy and Dinette had managed to 
amass ninety-five friends, 46 percent of those requested.150  
Commentators have developed many theories in the 
search to understand why individuals would carelessly turn 
over personal information; some speculate that users of social 
networking sites still do not appreciate the extent to which 
third parties can access their information,151 while others credit 
the sense of anonymity users feel amidst the hundreds of 
millions of social network profiles.152 Whichever theory is correct 
is beside the point; the frightening reality is that individuals 
are unknowingly surrendering their private information at 
alarming rates, which poses potentially grave problems for 
citizenship candidates. One can imagine information gathered 
from user-generated content is ripe for misunderstandings and 
there are no guarantees that citizenship petitioners and 
beneficiaries will be given the opportunity to explain 
themselves, especially if they are unaware of the “suspicious” 
content in the first place. It is now evident that the government 
will not give petitioners the benefit of the doubt, much less a 
warning before invading their privacy.  
V. GOVERNMENTAL INTRUSIONS INTO THE MARITAL 
RELATIONSHIP: COMPROMISING MARITAL PRIVACY IN THE 
INTEREST OF SPOUSAL PETITION DETERMINATIONS 
As previously noted, DHS investigations of American 
citizen petitioners’ marriages raise a number of privacy issues, 
which are further compounded by agents’ surreptitious 
presence on social networking sites. The following sections 
explore the major privacy issues facing citizenship petitioners 
and beneficiaries, as well as evaluate the struggle between the 
  
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. Eight users befriended Dinette of their own initiative. Id. Further 
statistics for Daisy and Dinette include, respectively: 89% and 57% of respondents gave 
their full date of birth; 100% and 88% provided their e-mail address; 74% and 22% 
listed their college or workplace; 46% and 31% divulged family and friend data. Id. 
 151 Samantha L. Millier, Note, The Facebook Frontier: Responding to the 
Changing Face of Privacy on the Internet, 97 KY. L.J. 541, 542 (2009). 
 152 Danielle Keats Citron, Fulfilling Government 2.0’s Promise with Robust 
Privacy Protections, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 822, 835 (2010) (quoting social media 
researcher danah boyd, “social network participants ‘live by security through obscurity, 
where they assume that as long as no one cares about them, no one will come knocking’” 
(faithful to researcher’s preferred orthography for her name written in lowercase)).  
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protection of governmental interests and the importance of 
marital privacy. In particular, the role that the Internet and 
social networking sites play in exacerbating the already 
existing tensions will be examined. 
A. The Elusive “Zone of Privacy” in Cross-Cultural 
Marriages 
The marital bond has long occupied an elevated status 
in constitutional due process jurisprudence.153 As established 
through Supreme Court precedent, it is “a relationship lying 
within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental 
constitutional guarantees.”154 Nonetheless, federal immigration 
procedures threaten the rights of citizen spouses in myriad 
ways. Consequently, when an American marries a noncitizen, 
their union is relegated to the outermost levels of that 
protected “zone.” One such example is the act of placing couples 
under surveillance and subjecting them to a fraud interview 
where they are asked questions that reflect antiquated notions 
of what an American marriage should look like.155 In this 
manner, the DHS exerts undue pressure on couples to conform 
to outdated norms, thereby excepting other cultural values and 
marital customs.156 The marital bond is then burdened by 
attempts to force conformity with USCIS conceptions of a valid 
marriage, including the amount of time spent together, level of 
intimacy, and decision to procreate.157  
As one commentator highlighted, while legislation since 
1986 has changed the procedure for applying for permanent 
resident status, the IMFA did not alter the standard for 
defining or identifying a bona fide marriage.158 More specifically, 
concrete definitions or standards were not communicated 
sufficiently in order to avoid the confusion that has resulted 
since its passage. The broad discretion afforded USCIS officers 
  
 153 See generally Moyce, supra note 48, at 1754-57. 
 154 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); see also Moyce, supra 
note 48, at 1776 (discussing the establishment of a protected interest in marital privacy 
through Supreme Court precedent); Sham Marriage, supra note 68, at 1244 (“Because 
of the intensely personal nature of the marital relationship, the Court has established 
a constitutionally protected zone of marital and familial privacy that the state cannot 
enter without a compelling justification.”). 
 155 See Sham Marriage, supra note 68, at 1246. 
 156 See id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Kikuyo Matsumoto-Power, Comment, Aliens, Resident Aliens, and U.S. 
Citizens in the Never-Never Land of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 15 U. HAW. 
L. REV. 61, 69 (1993). 
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combined with a lack of guidance has led to “ad hoc 
determinations based on their own subjective views of a valid 
marriage.”159 When such a significant part of each marital fraud 
determination relies on the discretion of administrative 
officers,160 and that broad discretion is compounded by a dearth 
of reviewable standards, it invites arbitrary and possibly 
discriminatory decisions,161 encouraging further attacks on the 
rights of the international couple. Plus, whatever grounds may 
exist for the maltreatment of nonresident aliens, no parallel 
justification exists for subjecting American citizens, who are one 
half of the equation, to possibly arbitrary infringements of their 
recognized rights.162 Nevertheless, “courts almost never discuss 
the issue of a U.S. citizen’s fundamental rights of marriage and 
marital privacy when they justify [DHS] restrictions.”163 
  
 159 Id. 
 160 For an instructive discussion of the discretionary nature and subjective 
considerations involved in the adjudication process, see 10.15 Exercise of Discretion; 
Uniformity of Decisions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/ 
portal/site/uscis/menuitem.f6da51a2342135be7e9d7a10e0dc91a0/?vgnextoid=fa7e539dc
4bed010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=fa7e539dc4bed010VgnVCM1
000000ecd190aRCRD&CH=afm (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). 
 161 The potential for arbitrariness is further exposed in instances where the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) acknowledges fault in a district’s denial of an I-
130 petition. See generally BIA Addresses Timeliness of Appeal and Discrepancies in 
Stokes Interview in Unpublished Decision, 84 No. 43 INTERPRETER RELEASES 2615, 
2615 (Nov. 5, 2007) (discussing In re Chen, A79 717 355 (BIA Oct. 9, 2007)). For 
instance, in the unpublished opinion, the BIA found, after listening to the interview 
transcript, that a New York district director improperly denied an I-130 petition on the 
grounds of discrepant answers during the Stokes interview. Id. Specifically, the BIA 
noted that some of the so-called “discrepancies” were actually consistent answers and 
others were relatively minor differences. Id. The BIA further found that the petitioner 
proffered reasonable explanations for the answers that were divergent, many of which 
only required a little cultural sensitivity and understanding. Id.  
[T]he Board found that the interview transcript revealed that, in the case of two 
of the cited discrepancies, the parties’ responses were actually consistent in 
that in response to a question about their bank account balance, the petitioner 
stated that it was “$1,000 something” and the beneficiary said initially that it 
was “$1,000 something” and then added that it was “like $1500,” and, 
concerning the petitioner’s children from his first marriage, the transcript 
reflected that both parties indicated that the beneficiary and the children had 
not met because they did not wish to do so. . . . Other discrepancies . . . related 
to Chinese cultural differences . . . . By way of example, the Board noted that 
the petitioner explained that the beneficiary did not know the name of his 
father who was living in China because she referred to him only by the 
traditional honorific “Father.” 
Id. 
 162 See Moyce, supra note 48, at 1776. 
 163 Matsumoto-Power, supra note 158, at 76. 
734 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:2 
B. A “Trilemma” for Citizen Spouses 
Of course, realistically speaking, not every couple 
investigated is engaged in a bona fide marriage, and those who 
are embroiled in a conspiratorial attempt to defraud the United 
States by way of immediate-relative preferential status have 
forfeited some of their rights. But those who find DHS protocol 
permissible on this basis assume too much. Their reverse logic 
has been countered by constitutional rationalizations that 
caution “even in the case of actual sham marriages, the [DHS] 
must apply its procedures before it can determine fraud. The 
[DHS] should not be permitted to bootstrap otherwise 
unconstitutional investigations through the results of those 
same investigations.”164  
Invasive investigatory procedures effectively leave 
American citizen spouses of nonresident aliens with three 
constitutionally inadequate options.165 In the first scenario, the 
citizen spouse is forced to submit to an intrusive DHS 
investigation, which comprises his right to marital privacy.166 
The second option envisions a petitioner who refuses to comply 
with DHS protocol, thereby preserving his right to privacy, but 
at the expense of his right to marry an individual of his 
choosing167 since she168 is likely to be placed into removal 
proceedings.169 The third course of action available to the 
American spouse avoids the forfeiture of marital and privacy 
rights, but requires him to leave the country with his bride.170 If 
this were a constitutionally viable option, it would justify 
practically any abridgement of rights since individuals can 
almost always escape a violation of their rights by emigrating.171 
Somewhat analogously, citizenship petitioners and beneficiaries 
could choose not to open a Facebook account, or post a family 
  
 164 Sham Marriage, supra note 68, at 1248 (“The fact that some marriages 
scrutinized by the [DHS] are fraudulent does not license the [DHS] to infringe upon the 
constitutional rights of all couples seeking adjustment of status.”). 
 165 Id. at 1247-48. 
 166 Id. at 1247. 
 167 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1966) (“The freedom to marry 
has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men.”). 
 168 Male and female pronouns are used as a reflection of current federal law, 
which precludes recognition for same-sex unions, regardless of state policy on the 
matter. See Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
 169 Sham Marriage, supra note 68, at 1247. 
 170 Id. at 1248. 
 171 Id. (“Thus, the [DHS] places legitimately married citizens and residents in 
a trilemma that is prima facie unconstitutional.”). 
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photo album on Flickr—though that would not prevent the 
presence of personal information by way of third parties, known 
or unknown. Still, the preferable solution would be to find a way 
in which the government could have access to petitioners’ 
information without invading the bounds of privacy. 
VI. TESTING THE APPLICABILITY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE TO USCIS INVESTIGATIONS ON SOCIAL 
NETWORKING SITES 
Throughout history, the development of emerging 
technologies has posed novel questions for the Supreme Court, 
requiring doctrinal and factual parallels to be made, and at 
times even leading to the creation of new fields of study.172 This 
technology-fueled legal evolution is particularly true of Fourth 
Amendment law.173 Concerns raised earlier about governmental 
invasions of privacy echo current debates on the scope of 
Fourth Amendment protection on the Internet. This part 
reviews the development of Fourth Amendment law from its 
British roots to its current penumbral iteration. Based on the 
expansion of Fourth Amendment interpretation, the following 
subsection superimposes the current legal framework onto the 
immigration marriage fraud investigatory process. While 
nevertheless concluding that a constitutional challenge to 
USCIS tactics would likely not succeed, this part seeks to 
illustrate that these governmental measures, even if they do 
not outright violate, at the very least offend the spirit of Fourth 
Amendment protection.  
A. A History Grounded in Tangible Property 
The Fourth Amendment’s roots can be traced to Great 
Britain under the regime of King George II.174 Through the 
issuance of a “general warrant,” the King would authorize 
officers to search private homes for evidence of a crime; no level 
of suspicion was needed to conduct a search.175 This unjustified 
invasion by the government into citizens’ private homes is the 
  
 172 See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 502 (1999) (contending that a law of cyberspace does exist and 
is of value to the study of law, in response to Hon. Frank H. Easterbrook’s Cyberspace 
and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207). 
 173 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: 
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 802 (2004).  
 174 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 21 (2006).  
 175 Id. 
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exact abuse the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent.176 
Therefore, it is the Fourth Amendment that provides the basis 
for an individual right of security from governmental 
intrusion.177 Yet, that right is not absolute, requiring courts to 
continually redefine its borders because “[a]s technology 
advances, legal rules designed for one state of technology begin 
to take on unintended consequences. . . . [and] the old rules no 
longer serve the same function. New rules may be needed to 
reestablish the function of the old rules in the new 
technological environment.”178 
Where technology has been the impetus for testing the 
limits of Fourth Amendment protection, the Supreme Court 
has been forced to reinterpret the language of the Amendment, 
while remaining faithful to its spirit.179 As Justice Brandeis 
famously dissented in Olmstead v. United States, 
The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the 
Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of 
rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that 
right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the 
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be 
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.180 
Justice Brandeis’s dissenting opinion ultimately persevered: 
Olmstead was overturned by Katz v. United States.181 
  
 176 Id. The text of the Fourth Amendment reads as two commands; the first 
secures a certain right from being violated, while the second limits the conditions 
under which a warrant is issued. Id. at 158. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 177 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 173, at 802-04. 
 178 Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General 
Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1009 (2010). 
 179 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2635 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“Applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies may sometimes be 
difficult, but when it is necessary to decide a case we have no choice. The Court’s 
implication . . . that where electronic privacy is concerned we should decide less than 
we otherwise would . . . or that we should hedge our bets by concocting case-specific 
standards or issuing opaque opinions-is in my view indefensible. The-times-they-are-a-
changin’ is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty.”). But see Kerr, supra note 173, at 805 
(“challeng[ing] the popular view of the Fourth Amendment[’s]” role in new technologies 
as “romantic but somewhat inaccurate” and arguing against an “aggressive” judiciary). 
 180 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 181 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“Thus, although a closely 
divided Court supposed in Olmstead that surveillance without any trespass and 
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court expanded the interpretation of 
Fourth Amendment rights to “protect[] people, not places.”182 
The Fourth Amendment, before Katz, was connected to 
real property law and was generally understood to protect 
those rights.183 This literal interpretation did not recognize a 
violation “unless there ha[d] been an official search and seizure 
of his person, or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible 
material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or 
curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure.”184 In the 
physical world, concrete distinctions exist that facilitate and 
guide Fourth Amendment analysis.185 The physical sphere 
creates logical barriers that divide activity and objects in the 
open from those behind closed doors.186 This foundational 
distinction187 between inside and outside naturally draws the 
line distinguishing permissible police conduct from 
impermissible surveillance.  
B. Parsing Fourth Amendment Application 
Despite the criticism of Katz since it was decided over 
four decades ago, it remains the dominant view in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.188 The “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test derived from Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion 
has been described as “the touchstone of the modern Fourth 
  
without the seizure of any material object fell outside the ambit of the Constitution, we 
have since departed from the narrow view on which that decision rested.”). 
 182 Id. at 351.  
 183 Joshua L. Simmons, Note, Buying You: The Government’s Use of Fourth-
Parties to Launder Data About “The People,” 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 950, 961; Kerr, 
supra note 173, at 809-10 (offering the relationship between the concepts, “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” and “the right to exclude,” as proof that “a strong and 
underappreciated connection exists between the modern Fourth Amendment and real 
property law”). 
 184 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. 
 185 Kerr, supra note 178, at 1009. 
 186 A practical example of this theory contains the following reasoning,  
The inside/outside distinction operates sensibly in a physical investigation 
governed by human eyesight. . . . The officer can use the surveillance tool of his 
eyes to see what is there. In contrast, closed spaces are closed from visual 
observation. . . . To see what is behind the barrier, the officer needs to break 
into the house, jimmy open the car trunk, unseal the letter, or otherwise break 
through the physical barrier that blocks his eyes from being able to see 
evidence inside. 
Id. at 1011. 
 187 Id. (declaring the distinction between government surveillance outside 
versus inside as the foundational distinction in Fourth Amendment law).  
 188 For an expanded discussion of the criticism that the Katz standard is either 
“too protective or not protective enough,” see Simmons, supra note 183, at 961-62. 
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Amendment.”189 Courts apply the test to new technologies in an 
effort to ascertain the reach of Fourth Amendment protection.190 
However, there is still relatively scarce case law on how the 
Fourth Amendment definitively “applies to government 
surveillance of Internet communications,” and whatever case 
law does exist “is presently highly unsettled.”191 Lawrence 
Lessig challenges, “When the ability to search without burden 
increases, does the government’s power to search increase as 
well? Or, more darkly, as James Boyle puts it: ‘Is freedom 
inversely related to the efficiency of the available means of 
surveillance?’ For if it is . . . then ‘we have much to fear.’”192 
Lessig’s query provides an apt segue to discuss the USCIS’s 
presence on social media; to that end, Fourth Amendment 
analysis serves as a useful framework for determining what 
privacy interests are at stake, if any.  
1. The Two-Fold Requirement for Privacy Recognition 
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz accepted the 
majority’s proposition that Fourth Amendment protection is 
aimed at individuals, but questioned “what protection it affords 
to those [individuals].”193 Harlan stated, “My understanding of 
the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a 
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”194 For a violation of Fourth Amendment rights to 
result, both inquiries in the two-step analysis “must be 
answered in the affirmative.”195 
2. Creating Parallels to Justice Harlan’s Framework 
The first prong of Harlan’s reasonableness test, whether 
a person had an actual subjective expectation of privacy, has 
been expressed as “whether the individual has shown that ‘he 
  
 189 Kerr, supra note 173, at 808 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 190 See id. A problem with the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test is its 
circular nature. Id. Only when a court rules to extend Fourth Amendment protection 
does an individual’s expectation of privacy then become reasonable. Id. 
 191 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 2 CRIM. PROC. § 4.4(a) (2010). 
 192 LESSIG, supra note 174, at 22. 
 193 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 194 Id. 
 195 Matthew J. Hodge, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Issues on the 
“New” Internet: Facebook.com and MySpace.com, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 95, 100 (2006). 
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seeks to preserve [something] as private.’”196 In attempting to 
apply these principles to a social network user’s profile,197 it has 
been cautioned that the mere action of joining a social network 
and creating a member profile inherently runs contrary to any 
expectation of privacy.198 An individual does not have any 
obligation to post information, pictures, or even sign up in the 
first place.199 Furthermore, popular social networks such as 
Facebook and Twitter make certain identifying information 
publicly available and require subscriber action to limit 
automatic, unrestricted accessibility to the rest.200 Also, unlike 
other correspondence, the aforementioned sites are intended to 
convey information to more than one person, which separates 
them from analyses of other forms of online correspondence, 
such as e-mail.201 Thus, in order for a user to prove a subjective 
expectation of privacy, he must first rebut the overwhelming 
presumption that he intended to make his information public.202  
a. Limited Profiles 
The case for a subjective expectation of privacy, if one 
exists, is strengthened when a user has taken active measures 
to restrict who may see his profile, arguably taking his profile 
out of plain sight of law enforcement.203 By having the 
forethought to place privacy controls on his profile, a user can 
communicate, to some extent, his intentions to keep the 
  
 196 Id. at 106 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (majority opinion)). 
 197 For example, a determination of whether an individual retains a subjective 
expectation of privacy in a photograph posted to a social networking site would 
necessarily incorporate multiple factors. Daniel Findlay, Tag! Now You’re Really “It”: 
What Photographs on Social Networking Sites Mean for the Fourth Amendment, 10 
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 171, 188 (2008). Such factors include:  
whether the photograph’s subject even has knowledge of the photograph’s 
existence, where the photograph was taken, who took the photograph, who 
posted the photograph, what device was used, what activities are documented 
in the photograph, why was the photograph taken, and the online privacy 
settings of both the uploader and the subject.  
Id.  
 198 Hodge, supra note 195, at 106. 
 199 Id. at 106-07. 
 200 See, e.g., Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/full_data_ 
use_policy (last visited Nov. 3, 2011); Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER, 
https://twitter.com/privacy (last visited Nov. 3, 2011) (“What you say on Twitter may be 
viewed all around the world instantly.”). 
 201 Hodge, supra note 195, at 107.  
 202 Id. 
 203 See discussion of “plain view” doctrine, infra Part VI.B.2.b. 
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information he posts private.204 It has been suggested that this 
phenomenon of the limited profile creates a unique quandary in 
that a user is taking steps to share information with select 
people that he could convey by more private means—such as e-
mail—but he is also deliberately choosing not to share that 
information with everyone.205  
b. Possible Pitfalls for Citizenship Applicants: The 
Exceptions 
In the development of Fourth Amendment legal theory, 
an exception to Fourth Amendment privacy rights was carved 
out for items “in plain view.”206 As Justice Harlan explained in 
his Katz concurrence, “objects, activities, or statements that he 
exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because 
no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited.”207 In 
the context of social networking sites, law enforcement officials 
need only provide an e-mail address to register and have access 
to all public profiles and whatever information on limited 
profiles the user has not restricted.208 Consequently, even if an 
individual were able to demonstrate a subjective expectation of 
privacy in a user profile, the plain view doctrine would seem to 
undermine any potential defense.209  
In addition to the plain view doctrine, another Fourth 
Amendment exception occurs when a person has voluntarily 
divulged information or consented to a search by the police.210 
Even if the police officer is undercover, Fourth Amendment 
protection will no longer apply.211 Furthermore, an individual 
also assumes the risk that information shared with third parties 
could be conveyed to the police.212 The consent exception, 
  
 204 See Hodge, supra note 195, at 110. 
 205 See id. at 110. 
 206 Id. at 108 (“However, even if a person could show an actual expectation of 
privacy, an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies 
when an object is in ‘plain view.’”); Findlay, supra note 197, at 196. 
 207 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 208 For an in-depth explanation of the mechanics of social networking sites 
and privacy policies, see generally Findlay, supra note 197.  
 209 Hodge, supra note 195, at 109. 
 210 See Findlay, supra note 197, at 195. 
 211 Hodge, supra note 195, at 111 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966)). 
 212 Id. at 111-12 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974)). A 
spreadsheet compiled by the EFF helpfully aggregates popular websites’ policies on 
releasing information to law enforcement. Spreadsheet, Social Media—A Guide to the Law 
Enforcement Guides, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/files/EFF_Social_ 
Network_Law_Enforcement_Guides-sprdsht.pdf. 
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therefore, further erodes the Fourth Amendment analysis, 
especially when combined with the plain view doctrine. 
c. The Objective Prong as a Societal Barometer 
Assuming the first prong of the reasonableness test were 
viable, a second hurdle must still be overcome with the objective 
prong of the test. Not everything that transpires online should 
be vulnerable to government intrusion; “‘[t]he government may 
not simply throw up its hands and err on the side of liberally 
granting its employees access to a wide range of data with the 
effect of losing the Fourth Amendment somewhere in 
cyberspace.’”213 The objective expectation of privacy translates to a 
determination of what society is prepared to honor as private 
from government surveillance.214 Considering the current 
attitudes toward215—and relevant case law concerning—
communications over the Internet, this finding would be 
unlikely.216 In conclusion, even if there is no privacy interest in 
social networking data that society is prepared to accept as 
reasonable, and no subjective privacy interest that courts are 
willing to give legal relevance, the federal government should still 
be faithful to the spirit of the Fourth Amendment and the goals of 
transparency and be more forthcoming about its practices. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on overblown estimates of attempts to defraud the 
United States government through sham marriages, Congress 
used its expansive power over immigration matters to correct 
what was presented as a grave problem in the administration of 
existing regulations. The product of irrational fears of marriage 
fraud schemes, the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 
1986 caused more problems than they solved. This note argued 
that the IMFA amounted to a devaluation of the family unit, 
casting a distrustful and cynical eye where familial unification 
had once been a main policy goal of immediate relative 
  
 213 Hodge, supra note 195, at 101 (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. U.S. 
Customs Serv., 307 U.S. App. D.C. 173, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).  
 214 See, e.g., Findlay, supra note 197, at 191. 
 215 See id. at 198 (suggesting that as the number and relative sophistication of 
Internet users increase, user generated content, such as photographs posted on social 
networking sites, will be considered wholly public communications). 
 216 Id. at 192 (suggesting an upheaval of current “awkward analogies to 20th 
Century objects and communications” if an objective expectation of privacy is ever to be 
found in the social networking context).  
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immigration. Where state law respected the sanctity of the 
marital relationship, immigration law intruded and imposed 
antiquated American mores. Consequently, this note explored the 
historical definition of “family” and its relation, or lack thereof, to 
current demographics. This note also discussed the normative 
repercussions of the disunity between American society in reality 
versus the ideal imposed upon citizen-spouse petitioners.  
The second half of this note focused on USCIS 
documents disclosed in response to a FOIA request that detail 
the agency’s surveillance of social networking sites. The ease 
with which government officials are able to access personal 
information on the Internet served as a precautionary tale for 
citizenship petitioners. The ramifications for marital privacy 
rights of the citizen spouse were subsequently evaluated. 
Finally, it was theorized that the privacy concerns raised by 
government intrusion into areas petitioners may expect to be 
private echoed debates over Fourth Amendment treatment of 
emergent technologies. 
Let us return to the story of Patricia and Saïd. The 
system, as it currently operates, has failed them; there are a 
few proposals, however, that could allow them a happier 
ending. First, if the USCIS publicly stated its policies on 
Internet surveillance, including those pertaining to social 
media, it would diminish much of the privacy invasion Patricia 
felt at being asked about her Facebook profile. Government 
transparency would also remove much of the debate from the 
constitutional privacy arena. Further, perhaps the visibility of 
these policies would give rise to a discourse on online versus 
physical world identities and the possible misinterpretations 
that can result from disharmonies therein. Patricia was not 
trying to assert on Facebook that she was not in a relationship; 
rather, Saïd is not a member of the site and anyone she cares 
about would already know she is in a loving marriage—there is 
no need to broadcast that fact on her profile.  
Also, if the government is pursuing efforts to modernize 
its investigations, then it should update the definition of 
“family” imposed on cross-cultural couples. Not only is it 
illogical to require Patricia and Saïd to conform to an ideal that 
does not match any of the American couples around them, but 
it also communicates value judgments that have no place in the 
marital context. Many American couples today do not comingle 
their finances or assets; thus, outdated and nearsighted 
requests for documents such as joint bank statements should 
not be accorded the significance they currently import. 
2012] IMMIGRATION MARRIAGE FRAUD INVESTIGATION 743 
Although these suggestions are not exhaustive, they do propose 
minor remedies that in combination can have a remarkable 
effect on attitudes about government treatment of immigrants 
and their place in the American family. 
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